Training Rights in Paraguay, Colombia and Mexico: Three Different Latin American Models
By Futbol CV| Series: Training Rights in Football
This article is part of ourGlobal Guide to Training Rights in Football. Here we analyze three Latin American systems that represent different approaches: the faithful replica of FIFA (Paraguay), regulation with player participation (Colombia) and the post-Gentleman's Agreement model (Mexico).
Paraguay: the most faithful replica of the FIFA model in South America
Paraguay maintains the training rights system most aligned with FIFA among South American countries. It doesn't reinvent the wheel: it takes the FIFA model and extends it to the domestic sphere with minimal adjustments.
Legal framework
The system is based on two standards:
- Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players of the APF (2021):Replicates the two FIFA mechanisms — training compensation and solidarity mechanism — for transfers between Paraguayan clubs.
- Law 5322/14 (Professional Football Player Statute):Complements the regulatory framework by establishing labor rights of players and regulating contractual aspects.
How it works
Training compensation:Applies when a player signs his first professional contract or is transferred before the age of 23. The categorization of clubs follows CONMEBOL parameters.
Solidarity mechanism:5% of the transfer price is distributed among training clubs, with the same table of percentages by age as FIFA (0.25% for 12-15 years, 0.50% for 16-23 years).
Procedure:Disputes are resolved through a summary administrative procedure before theRecords Managementof the APF, with a specific disciplinary regime for clubs that fail to comply with their payment obligations.
Advantages of the Paraguayan model
Simplicity is its greatest strength. By faithfully replicating the FIFA model, professionals who already know the international system immediately understand how it works at the domestic level. There is no duplication of rules or regulatory conflicts. It also makes audits and compliance easier as the standards are uniform.
Colombia: training rights with player participation
Colombia has a system regulated by the Colombian Football Federation (FCF) with several particularities that differentiate it from other Latin American models.
Legal framework
- FCF Player Statute(Resolution 3600/2017, modified by Resolution 3779/2018): Establishes training compensation mechanisms for domestic transfers.
- FCF Disciplinary Code:Contains provisions on non-compliance with financial obligations related to transfers.
Colombian system requirements
COMET registration:For a training club to claim compensation, the player must have been registered in the systemCOMET(FCF registration system) during the training period (12-21 years). Without registration, there is no right.
Domestic transfers only:The FCF Player Statute applies exclusively to transfers between Colombian clubs. For international transfers, FIFA rules apply.
Player participation: 8%
A Colombian peculiarity with no equivalent in most countries: Colombian legislation establishes a8% player shareon the sale of sports rights. This percentage is deducted from the transfer price and paid directly to the player.
This creates a dynamic where the selling club receives less than the nominal value of the transfer: 5% solidarity is deducted for training clubs plus 8% for the player, leaving a net 87% for the seller.
Referral to FIFA RSTP
For cases not expressly contemplated in the FCF Player Statute, the regulations refer directly to the FIFA RSTP as supplementary legislation. This includes calculation criteria, categorization and procedures not regulated locally.
Mexico: from the Gentlemen's Pact to the Regulation of Participation by Training
The Mexican case is probably the most dramatic in Latin America. For 17 years, the Mexican soccer transfer system was governed by an illegal collusive agreement — the infamousGentleman's Agreement—which was demolished by the antitrust authority. Only after that did a regulated system of training rights emerge.
The Gentlemen's Pact (2002-2019)
For almost two decades, Mexican soccer officials maintained an informal agreement by which the clubs committed todo not hire players with expired contractsfrom other Mexican clubs without paying "compensation" negotiated directly between directors. This practice:
- It was not based on any sports regulations.
- The amounts were arbitrary, decided by the managers without objective parameters.
- Severely restricted the free movement of players.
- It exclusively benefited the big clubs that had negotiating power.
En2019, theCOFECE (Federal Economic Competition Commission)sanctioned the Gentlemen's Pact as aviolation of the Federal Economic Competition Law, describing it as a collusive agreement between competitors that restricted competition in the labor market for professional soccer players.
The FMF Training Participation Regulations (2020)
After the demolition of the Gentlemen's Pact, the Mexican Football Federation (FMF) implemented a formal system of training rights in 2020. The regulation establishes:
Amounts by age:
| Age | Amount per year |
|---|---|
| 12-15 years | USD 2,000/year |
| 16-21 years | USD 40,000/year |
Activation trigger:Unlike most systems that are activated with the signing of the first professional contract, the Mexican system has a particular trigger: it is activated with thefirst registration in Liga MXor when accumulating765 minutes of playin the First Division.
The criterion of 765 minutes (equivalent to approximately 8.5 full games) is unique. OnlyPerushares a similar criterion based on minutes played. The logic is to link compensation not only to registration but to the player's effective participation in professional competition.
Differences with the previous system
The contrast with the Gentleman's Agreement is total:
| Appearance | Gentleman's Agreement | FMF Regulation 2020 |
|---|---|---|
| Legal basis | Illegal informal agreement | Formal federation regulations |
| Amounts | Arbitrary, negotiated | Tabulated and public |
| Application | Only clubs with "power" | All clubs |
| Legitimacy | Sanctioned by COFECE | Approved by FIFA |
| Transparency | Opaque | Objective criteria |
The legacy of the Gentleman's Pact
The Mexican case serves as a warning: when there is no formal regulation of training rights, market actors tend to create informal mechanisms that end up being illegal and harmful. The existence of clear regulations – however imperfect – is always preferable to opaque self-regulation.
Comparison between the three models
| Appearance | Paraguay | Colombia | Mexico |
|---|---|---|---|
| Alignment with FIFA | Very high | Medium | Low |
| Categorization | Yes (CONMEBOL) | Yes (per division) | No (fixed amounts) |
| Player participation | No | Yes (8%) | No |
| Activation trigger | First contract | COMET Registry | 765 minutes in 1st gear |
| Resolution body | APF Records Management | FCF | FMF Commission |
| Amounts | According to CONMEBOL table | According to FCF regulations | USD 2,000-40,000/year |
| Problem history | No | No | Gentlemen's Agreement |
Lessons for other countries
From Paraguay:The simplicity of replicating the FIFA model with minimal local adjustments works. Not everything has to be reinvented.
From Colombia:The player's participation in the value of his transfer is a progressive principle that other countries could consider, although it reduces the net income of the selling club.
From Mexico:Formal regulation is always preferable to informal agreements. The minutes played criterion is innovative and could be replicated to prevent clubs from training players who never become effective professionals.
→ Return to the Global Guide to Training Rights
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