Training Rights in Uruguay and Chile: The Regulatory Void and the Questioned Fixed Amount
By Futbol CV| Series: Training Rights in Football
This article is part of ourGlobal Guide to Training Rights in Football. Here we analyze two cases that illustrate opposite extremes: Uruguay without domestic regulation and Chile with a system under antitrust scrutiny.
Uruguay and Chile represent two different but equally relevant problems for training clubs. Uruguay — one of the world's largest per capita exporters of soccer talent — lacks domestic training rights regulations, which hurts its smaller clubs. Chile has a system, but its fixed-amount design without categories is being challenged before free competition courts.
Uruguay: the large exporter without domestic regulation
The Uruguayan paradox
Uruguay consistently produces world-class soccer talent, and international transfers of Uruguayan players generate millions of dollars annually. However, theThe Uruguayan Football Association (AUF) has not implemented a compensation regulation for trainingfor transfers between Uruguayan clubs.
In practice, this means that when a 17-year-old player trained in a club in the interior of the country is signed by Nacional or Peñarol, the training clubdoes not receive any compensationfor his years of investment in sports development.
The FIFA system does apply to international transfers
When a Uruguayan player is transferred abroad, training clubs can benefit from the FIFA solidarity mechanism (5% of the transfer price) and training compensation for players under 23 years of age. But for this to work, the training club must be registered in the FIFA system and know its rights — something that many small clubs do not know.
The AUF-ONFI agreement: a partial patch
The only existing complementary mechanism is the agreement between the AUF and theNational Children's Football Organization (ONFI). This agreement internally distributes the funds received through FIFA solidarity with a notable peculiarity: it recognizes training from the6 years old, long before the FIFA 12.
The distribution works like this: the solidarity funds are distributed in10 equal partsbetween three levels: ONFI (as the governing body of children's football), the departmental leagues and the individual clubs where the player was registered during his childhood.
This system has symbolic and practical value, but only applies to funds that arrive through FIFA — that is, exclusively from international transfers. For domestic transfers, there is still no mechanism.
What do Uruguayan clubs lose?
The absence of domestic regulation especially affects inland clubs: Cerro Largo, Deportivo Maldonado, Plaza Colonia, among others. Many of these clubs detect and develop talent in early stages that is then captured by the big clubs in Montevideo without compensation.
The contrast with Argentina — where Law 27,211 protects neighborhood clubs from the age of 9 — is stark. If Uruguay implemented a similar system, dozens of inland and children's soccer clubs would receive recurring income for their training work.
Chile: the fixed amount under free competition scrutiny
The current system
Chile does have a domestic training rights system, regulated by theArticle 44 of the Young Football Regulations of the ANFP (National Professional Football Association).
The design is simple — perhaps too simple:
- Amount:USD 30,000 for each year of training
- Period:Players under 23 years of age
- Uncategorized:The same amount applies regardless of the category of the training club or the acquiring club
This lack of categorization is the central problem. Under the FIFA system and most national systems, the amounts vary depending on the category of the club (both the trainer and the acquirer). The Chilean lump sum model does not distinguish between a First Division club signing a player from a Third Division club and two clubs of the same category exchanging players.
The antitrust challenge
In January 2026, the Osorno Provincial Sports Club presented aconsultation before the Court for the Defense of Free Competition (TDLC)questioning the ANFP training rights system.
InMarch 2026, theNational Economic Prosecutor's Office (FNE)issued a forceful report concluding that the current design of the systemrestricts free competitionin the market of professional soccer players in Chile. The main criticisms of the FNE were:
Mobility restriction:The fixed amount of USD 30,000/year works as an entry barrier that makes it difficult to hire young players, especially for clubs in lower categories.
Lack of proportionality:By not distinguishing categories of clubs, the system treats clubs with very different economic and training capacities the same.
FNE Recommendation:Align with the FIFA model of proportional categorization, where the amount varies according to the category of the club and the confederation, ensuring that compensation reflects the real cost of training.
Current situation (March 2026)
The case is pending before the TDLC withfour additional demandsfrom other clubs against the ANFP for the same issue. The system is likely to be reformed in the coming months to incorporate some type of categorization.
Meanwhile, training fee charges continue under current rules, generating significant legal uncertainty for Chilean domestic transfers.
Lessons from the Chilean case
The Chilean case illustrates an important risk: a poorly designed training rights system can end up harming competition and player mobility instead of protecting training clubs. Proportionality — present in FIFA, Argentina, Brazil and France — turns out to be an essential, not optional, principle.
Comparison: Uruguay vs. Chile vs. reference models
| Appearance | Uruguay | Chile | Argentina | Brazil |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Do you have a home system? | ❌ No | ✅ Yes (questioned) | ✅ Yes (triple layer) | ✅ Yes (Lei Pelé) |
| Club Categorization | N/A | ❌ Fixed amount | ✅ 4 categories | ✅ By division |
| Amount/Percentage | N/A | USD 30,000/year | 5% + 1.5× CCT minimum | 6% solidarity |
| Normative range | AUF-ONFI agreement only | ANFP Regulations | National law + regulation | Federal law |
| Controversy | Regulatory gap | Antitrust challenge | Stable, with jurisprudence | Stable, consolidated |
| Early training | From 6 years (ONFI) | Not specified | From 9 years (Law) | From 12 years |
What Uruguay and Chile should do
Uruguayurgently needs a domestic training rights regulation. The Paraguayan model — a faithful replica of the FIFA system adapted to the local level — would be a good starting point due to its simplicity and alignment with international standards. Alternatively, it could follow the Argentine model of Law 27,211, elevating protection to legislative status.
Chileneeds to reform its system by incorporating proportional categorization. The FNE's recommendation to align with the FIFA model is sensible: categories I-IV according to the club's division, with staggered amounts that reflect real differences in training and investment capacity.
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