Multi-owned clubs (MCO): FIFA and UEFA regulation updated 2026

In May 2025, Crystal Palace won the FA Cup and qualified for the Europa League. Three months later, it was degraded to the Conference League — not for sports reasons, but because John Textor, its main investor, also controlled the Olympic Lyonnais, which had classified the same competition. Two clubs of the same owner cannot play in the same European tournament.

Welcome to the world of Multi-ownership of clubs (Multi-Club Ownership, MCO) — the phenomenon that is transforming football and that regulation does not end.

The MCO is today an unstoppable reality: groups such as City Football Group (Manchester City, Girona, Mumbai City, etc.), Red Bull (Leipzig, Salzburg, New York, Bragantino), the Pozzo family (Watford, Udinese, Granada), and dozens of other investors hold shares in multiple clubs around the world. The benefits are clear — synergies in scouting, player development, economies of scale — but risks to the integrity of competitions as well.

In this article I explain how FIFA and UEFA regulate multi-ownership, what happened to Crystal Palace and other emblematic cases, and what any club, investor or agent operating in this ecosystem should take into account.

What this article covers

What is the multi-ownership of clubs and why it grows
FIFA Regulation: Art. 18bis of the RETJ and the Club World Cup
UEFA regulation: Article 5 of the competition regulations
The concept of "decisive influence" and its 4 indicators
The March 1 assessment date: why it is key
The 3 flagship cases of 2025: Crystal Palace, DAC/Győri, Drogheda
Regulation at national level: Premier League, Portugal and others
Limits on loans and transfers between affiliated clubs
What Clubs in MCO Structures Must Do to Meet

What is club multi-ownership

The multi-ownership of clubs exists when the same person, company, investment fund or economic group has control or influence shares The phenomenon has grown exponentially in the last decade, driven by the globalization of football, the search for financial returns and the operational advantages of managing a network of clubs.

Some of the world's best known multi-property groups include City Football Group (13+ clubs), Red Bull (4 major clubs), the Pozzo family, Ryan Reynolds' Pacific Media group and Rob McElhenney, John Textor's Eagle Football, and many others.

The central problem is: Multiproperty is not illegal in itself. What is regulated — and increasingly strictly — is the participation of clubs under common control in the same competitions. If two clubs of the same group face each other or compete for the same positions, the integrity of sports is questioned.

FIFA Regulation

Art. 18bis of the RETJ: influence of third parties in clubs

At FIFA level, the main rule is the art. 18bis of the RETJwhich prohibits a club from signing a contract allowing another club or a third party to take a position from which it can influence labour and transfer issues related to the independence, politics or sports performance of the club.

This prohibition is broader than the multiple ownership in the strict sense: it covers any form of external influence that compromises the autonomy of the club, whether by shareholding, contractual agreements, conditional financing or other mechanisms.

Restrictive interpretation: According to the Commentary on the RSTP and the case law of the TAS, Article 18bis must be interpreted restrictively. real ability to exert effective influence on the club’s decisions on employment or transfers. In case of doubt, the club is favoured (in dubio pro reo).

FIFA Club World Cup 2025: Article 10 of the Rules of Procedure

For the FIFA Club World Cup 2025FIFA first introduced specific rules on multi-property at FIFA competition level. Article 10 of the Tournament Rules prohibits clubs under common control from competing simultaneously in the tournament and establishes mechanisms to resolve property conflicts.

UEFA regulation: Article 5 of the European competitions

The most developed and most strictly applied regulation is that of the UEFAcontained in the art. 5 the rules of procedure of the Champions League, Europa League and Conference League (season 2025/26).

The general rule

No natural or legal person may have decisive control or influence about more than one club participating in the the same European competitionThis includes:

Owning (direct or indirect) shares in more than one club
Have any power over the management, administration or sporting performance of more than one club
Being involved in managing more than one club

The 4 indicators of " decisive influence"

In May 2024, UEFA issued a circular defining four indicators to assess whether "decidant influence" exists:

1. Shareholders ' rights/partners
Percentage of participation, voting rights, ability to appoint or dismiss directors.

2. Financial support
Loans, guarantees, capital contributions or other financing mechanisms that generate dependence.

3. Governance
Superposition of key managers, executives or staff among clubs. Roles shared in decision-making bodies.

4. Player Transfers
Transfer patterns between clubs of the group suggesting coordination or lack of independence in sports decisions.

The key point that the TAS confirmed in its 2025 decisions: there is no need to demonstrate effective influence — the possibility of exercising it is sufficientIf the ownership structure allows a person to influence two clubs, there is already a violation, even if that person says he never exercised that influence.

The March 1 date: the change that changed everything

For the 2025/26 season, UEFA advanced the assessment date from 3 June to 1 March This change was decisive: before, the clubs knew in June if they had classified European competitions and could restructure at the last moment. Now, they must be in compliance months before you know if they're going to qualify.

Without the possibility of "healing" the breach: The three awards of the 2025 TAS made it clear that no post-March correction mechanism. If as of 1 March the property structure violated the MCO rules, no subsequent restructuring (sale of shares, blind trusts, waivers of charges) can remedy it for that season. In December 2025, UEFA confirmed by circular that 1 March is still the final date for the 2026/27 season.

The 3 emblematic cases of 2025

Case	Clubs involved	Decision	TAS result
Crystal Palace / Lyon	Crystal Palace (England) and Olympia Lyonnais (France), both connected to John Textor via Eagle Football	Crystal Palace degraded from Europa League to Conference League. Lyon retained its place.	TAS confirmed the decision (August 2025). It rejected competition arguments.
DAC / Győri ETO	FC DAC 1904 (Slovakia) and Győri ETO FC (Hungary), linked through EEA Holding B.V.	DAC excluded from the Conference League. Győri admitted.	TAS confirmed (July 2025). One-person shared roles in both clubs = decisive influence.
Drogheda United	Drogheda United FC (Ireland), linked to another club in MCO structure	UEFA denied admission to competition	TAS confirmed, first award validating the new date of 1 March.

Crystal Palace was the most media case: a club that won the FA Cup for sporting merit but was unable to compete in the tournament for which it qualified. The impact was not only sporty but economic — the income difference between Europa League and Conference League is millions of euros.

Regulation at the national level

In addition to FIFA and UEFA rules, many national leagues have their own restrictions:

Premier League (England): It prohibits anyone from directly or indirectly having the power to influence the management of more than one Premier League club. This rule is one of the strictest in the world at the domestic league level.

Portugal (Law 39/2023): It prohibits a person with a qualified participation in a sports society from simultaneously holding a qualified participation in another sports society competing in the same national competition of the same sport. It is under review by September 2026.

The League (Spain), Series A (Italy), Bundesliga (Germany): They have their own restrictions with different nuances. The general trend is towards greater regulation.

Impact on transfers

Multi-property has a direct impact on the transfer market, and is a matter of particular concern to regulators:

Internal transfers at non-market prices: Recent academic studies have shown that transfers between clubs of the same MCO group present price dynamics different from those of the open market. The case of Rio Ave/Olympiacos in January 2026 — where the owner admitted to having rejected offers of €20 and €10 million by two players to transfer them to his other club for significantly smaller amounts — illustrates the risks.

Loan limits (Article 10 RETJ): The restrictions of 6 general loans and 3 between two specific clubs were designed in part to limit the excessive movement of players within MCO networks. The exemption for children under 21 formed by the club does not apply to the limit between two clubs (ap. 8).

Mandatory declaration in the MST: In each international transfer, clubs must make a statement about the influence of third parties (Article 10, Appendix 4, Annex 3 of the RETJ). This allows FIFA to monitor movements between clubs of the same group.

What Clubs Should Do in MCO Structures

Compliance Guide for MCO Network Clubs

Evaluate your structure on March 1st of each year. If there is a possibility that two clubs of the group will qualify for the same UEFA competition, the structure must be clean before that date.
Don't count on restructuring later. The 2025 TAS awards made it clear that there is no "second chance" after March 1.
Review the 4 indicators of decisive influence: If there is overlap in any of them, there is risk.
Maintain truly independent governances. Separate directories, separate executives, autonomous sports decisions. Blind trusts can help, but they must be genuine.
Document the independence of transfer decisions. If a club of the group sells a player to another club of the group, the price must reflect market value and the transaction must be duly justified.
Consultation with specialized legal advisers. The margin of error is minimal and the consequences are severe (exclusion of competitions, reputational damage, financial loss).

The future of MCO regulation

The MCO phenomenon is not going to disappear — on the contrary, it continues to grow. The question is whether regulation will keep pace with investor innovation. In October 2025, UEFA proposed a system of "double deadline" (flag in March, resolution in June), but in December 2025 confirmed that 1 March remains the final date for 2026/27.

Open topics for the coming years include: whether FIFA will adopt its own MCO rules beyond the Club World Cup, how internal transfers within MCO networks will be regulated at prices that do not reflect the market, and whether national leagues will harmonize their rules with those of UEFA or maintain divergent approaches.

What is certain: multi-ownership is at a regulatory crossroads. And for clubs, investors and players, understanding these rules is not optional — it is an operational necessity.

This guide is based on the July 2025 edition RETJ, the UEFA Champions League / Europa League / Conference League 2025/26 (art. 5), the awards of the TAS published in November 2025 (Crystal Palace, DAC, Drogheda), and analysis of Peterka Partners, LawInSport, Bird & Bird (Lexology), ECIJA, Visers Legal, GIS, PowerPlay, Melbourne SLA and Ebadat PLLC. This guidance is informative and does not replace the advice of a specialized lawyer.

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Multi-owned clubs (MCO): FIFA and UEFA regulation updated 2026